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ABSTRACT

THE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF ILLUSORY JUDGMENTS: REEXAMINATION
OF ILLUSION OF CONTROL RESEARCH

by

Paul Keith Presson
University of New Hampshire, May 1997
The present dissertation examines the well-established research paradigm known
as the illusion of control. Until now, researchers have employed one basic paradigm
which has addressed the illusion of control as a unidimensional phenomenon. In Study 1,
91 female undergraduates were presented with three induction conditions used by
previous researchers. Factor analyses showed that judgments from these tasks did not tap
into a single process, but rather fell into two types of illusory judgments —belief- and
contingency-based. In Study 2,182 female undergraduates were exposed to the same
three induction conditions used in Study 1 plus two additional contingency tasks. As in
Study 1, the results from factor analyses demonstrated a multidimensional factor structure
in which contingency judgments were differentiated from performance judgments. In
addition, judgments based on time-line contingency tasks loaded separately from
contingency judgments from the key and light task. Study 2 identified two groups of
behavior. Participants' self-reported likelihood of voting in the 1996 presidential election
and frequency of prayer were labeled as control-based behavior. Frequency of reading
viii
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published horoscopes and giving higher validity rating to them were labeled as beliefbased behavior. The results showed that the different illusion factors interacted
differentially with desire for control and level of belief in the paranormal when predicting
belief-based and control-based behavior. Judgment type also interacted differentially with
desire for control and paranormal belief when predicting reports of overall happiness.
Finally, methodological implications for future research were discussed.
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INTRODUCTION

People's desire to control the environment can be readily inferred from everyday
observation of their behavior. Thousands of people marching on Washington in an attempt
to change governmental policy, public participation in the election process, the use o f
"systems" designed to beat state lotteries or other games o f chance, financial analysts
tracking trends in the stock market, people's use of controversial medical regimens to
combat AIDS or cancer, and the reliance on astrological advice to guide one's behavior
are only a few examples of how people often try to increase the level of control in their
lives. From an evolutionary standpoint, organisms that demonstrated the most control
over the environment would be the most likely to survive and reproduce. From a
psychological standpoint, a desire to control the environment combined with the feeling
that one is in control of his or her life, would result in greater feelings of well-being.
The belief that one can control life events has consistently been the emphasis of
psychological theorists. Adler (1920) argued that humans are motivated to overcome
feelings of inferiority and helplessness that develop during infancy. In their striving for
superiority, individuals often attempt to influence social situations by tapping into an
inherent potential that Adler (1939) referred to as social interest. A person who develops
strong social interest will strive to better society, whereas one who does not will strive
only for personal superiority. One who exerts a striving for superiority toward others will
be more successful in adapting to life's demands. Similarly, White (1959) argued that

1
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humans are motivated to interact effectively with the environment. The motive behind this
motivation to demonstrate competence is not the acquisition of any external rewards that
may accompany the control, but rather the sense of mastery over the environment for its
own sake.
One of the main tenets of Heider's (1958) "naive psychology" was that both
scientists and lay people strive to understand, predict, and control events that are of
interest to them. Both use their observations to form and modify theories about the
environment. Kelley (1972, p. 2) stated that a person will not only strive to understand,
but also attempt to apply that understanding "in order to exercise control of his world."
Many researchers have focused on the positive consequences of believing that one
has control over life events. Lefcourt (1973, p. 424) argued that a "sense of control, the
illusion that one can exercise personal choice, has a definite and a positive role in
sustaining life." In his review of the literature, Averill (1973) suggested that cognitive
factors associated with personal control, such as the appraisal of stressful situations, are as
important in determining the effects of life events on an individual as is one's actual level
of influence on the situation. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) argued that the degree to which
one persists in believing that he or she can control the environment determines, in part, the
likelihood that a stressful situation will be perceived as a challenge rather than a threat.
Challenge appraisals are more likely to be dealt with in a constructive manner than are
threat appraisals.
Taylor and Brown (1988) argued that positive illusory perceptions, including
exaggerated perceptions of control, promote mental health, as demonstrated by the ability
2
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to care about others, happiness, and the ability to be creative and productive at work. This
theory is not without its critics, however, and although these critics do not agree with
Taylor and Brown's overall hypothesis, some admit that positive illusions can "function in
an individual as a short-term and even long-term fix to avoid confronting personally
threatening self-recognitions" (Colvin & Block, 1994, p. 17). Perceptions of control have
also been associated with better physical health (Schmale & Iker, 1966), greater adherence
to medical regimens (Janis & Rodin, 1979), better adaptation to life changes (Mullen &
Suls, 1982), and a greater perception of procedural justice in the legal system (Thibaut &
Walker, 1975; LaTour, 1978).
Other researchers have focused more on the negative consequences resulting from
one's perception of a lack of personal control. Mandler (1975) hypothesized that the
inability o f an organism to complete a well-organized plan of action, and the lack o f any
alternate plan, can lead to helplessness and disorganization. "The organism does not
'know' what to do" (p. 199). He argued that this perception of helplessness and
disorganization defines anxiety. He further claimed that any alternate plan can serve to
control anxiety regardless of its direct relevance or value to the situation. What is
important is that the plan of action be well-organized by the organism.
In contrast to Mandlefs (1975) theory, Seligman (1975) argued that helplessness
results from repeated exposure to negative outcomes that are noncontingent upon one's
responses. Learned helplessness is demonstrated by a failure to respond to aversive stimuli
and a decrease in learning ability. In a revision of Seligman's theory, Abramson, Seligman,
and Teasdale (1978) hypothesized that attributional processes determined the
3
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consequences o f perceived helplessness. Other theorists have suggested that attributional
processes not only affect the outcomes of a perceived lack of control, but they are the
result of an individual's need to achieve a sense of control (Kelley, 1967, 1971).
Whether the topic of the research is learned helplessness, locus of control, selfefficacy, depression, social influence, intrinsic motivation, attribution theory, or desire for
control, psychologists have identified personal control as a central concept in social and
personality psychology research. According to Burger (1992), in general, most people
prefer to exert control over the environment and this desire for control has an important
influence on human behavior.
Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) conceptualized control along two
dimensions, primary control and secondary control. Primary control refers to efforts that
are intended to have a direct influence on the environment. Secondary control is
demonstrated when a person attempts to maintain control over a situation by aligning him
or herself with environmental forces that are believed to be controlling agents. Although
this distinction is an interesting one, few measures have been designed to assess individual
differences along these dimensions. Thus, I have limited my focus to the concept of
primary control.
Illusion of Control
Because control beliefs are commonplace, and because the consequences of a lack
of control are so potentially negative, individuals often behave as if they have control in
chance situations. A "chance" situation is one in which the objective probability of one of
the possible outcomes occurring is the same as the probability of any of the other
4
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outcomes occurring. These chance events are by definition uncontrollable. In contrast, a
skill situation is one in which there exists a connection between responses and outcomes,
and therefore, is to some extent controllable. Langer (1975) labeled the failure to
distinguish between "chance" and "skiH" events as an illusion of control. Specifically, she
defined an illusion of control as "an expectancy of a personal success probability
inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant" (p. 313). She argued
that in everyday life, the distinction between skill and chance situations is often not clear.
She further hypothesized that when factors normally associated with skill situations are
present in chance situations, people will often perceive contingency between actions and
outcomes where none exists. According to Langer, skill-related factors are those
commonly associated with an increase in the probability of achieving nonrandom
outcomes. Skill-related factors include, but are not limited to choice, stimulus or response
familiarity, active involvement in the task, and competition.
Langeris (1975) initial research consisted of six experiments in which skill-related
factors were introduced into objectively uncontrollable situations. In experiment 1, 36
male participants were placed in competition with a confederate. In the "dapper"
condition, the confederate was well dressed and behaved in a confident, outgoing manner.
In the "schnook" condition, the confederate behaved in a shy and awkward fashion, had a
nervous twitch, and was dressed in a sport coat that was too small for him. Participants
wagered between 0 and 25 cents on each of four rounds in which both the participant and
the confederate selected a card from a standard deck of cards, with the higher card
winning the round. The dependent variable was the amount of money wagered. Langer
5
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found that individuals in the schnook condition wagered more money on average than did
participants in the dapper condition. Langer concluded that in a competitive situation, the
characteristics of one's opponent affect his level of confidence in his ability to succeed.
In other experiments, Langer (1975) allowed one group of participants to choose
their own lottery tickets while a second group was given tickets by the experimenter. She
found that individuals in the choice group required more money in order to sell their
tickets than did those who had no choice. She also found that participants whose lottery
tickets contained familiar symbols (letters of the alphabet) were less likely than
participants with unfamiliar tickets (line drawings of novel symbols) to trade their ticket
for one in a game with better odds. Finally, Langer found that active involvement and
response familiarity (practice) produced responses suggesting illusory judgments of
control.
Langer concluded that the presence of skill-related factors makes chance situations
appear similar to skill situations and, consequently, increases the likelihood that a person
will approach the situation with a skill orientation. Langer suggested that when factors are
introduced that shift the individual's focus back to the chance elements in a situation, the
illusion of control will dissipate. Langer referred to these factors as "intrusions of reality"
(p. 327).
Langer and Roth (1975, p. 952) hypothesized that because people want "to see"
themselves as the cause of their successes (see Adler, 1930; deCharms, 1968; Lefcourt,
1973), they are likely to attend to and employ cues from the environment that support this
notion. One such cue would be a consistent pattern of task outcomes. According to
6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Langer and Roth, people assume that if a situation is controllable, one will be successful or
fail rather consistently depending on his or her ability to perform the task. In contrast,
one's performance on a chance task would be characterized by a random series of
successes and failures. According to Langer and Roth, "the motivation to see events as
controllable is so strong that the introduction of just one cue, a fairly consistent sequence
o f wins (with runs of no more than four in a row), is enough to induce an illusion of
control" (p. 955).
To test the hypothesis that outcome sequence can induce an illusion of control,
Langer and Roth (1975) asked participants to predict the outcome of coin flips. In all
conditions participants received feedback that indicated 15 correct and 15 incorrect
predictions. The outcome sequence for each condition was rigged so that participants in
the descending outcome group received the majority of hits during the first 15 trials, in the
ascending group during the last 15 trials, and those in the random group received an equal
number o f hits in both halves of the 30 trials.
Langer and Roth (1975) found that participants who received the descending
sequence o f outcomes rated their prediction ability higher than did people in the ascending
and random groups, and claimed more correct predictions than did the participants in the
other two groups. When asked to predict their performance on another 100 trials, people
in the descending group predicted greater success than did participants in the other two
groups. According to Langer and Roth, people decide whether a task is skill or chance
oriented early in a sequence of outcomes and dismiss inconsistent information after the
attribution has been made. Although participants in the ascending group also received a
7
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consistent sequence of outcomes early in the task, people prefer to attribute their failures
to situational factors and it was probably easy for them to accept the chance nature of the
coin flipping task as a preferred explanation for the outcomes.
As mentioned earlier, Langer (1975) defined an illusion of control as a judgment of
personal success higher than the objective odds would warrant. Langer, however, did not
test this operationalization. All of Langer1s conclusions are based on comparisons between
responses of participants in an induction group and those in a control group. She did not
test her participants1judgments of control against any preestablished criteria for success.
For example, Langer and Roth (1975) found that participants in the descending group
estimated that they would correctly predict an average of 54 out of 100 future coin flips,
while those in the random group estimated only 51 and in the ascending group only 49.
The estimate o f individuals in the descending group was statistically significant from those
in the other two groups, but what the authors did not report was whether any of the
estimations differed significantly from the 50 hits that a chance model would predict.
In a replication of Langer and Roth's (1975) experiment, Sweeney, Benassi, and
Drevno (1980) also found that participants in the descending group provided significantly
higher estimates of future performance than did those people in the ascending group.
However, when tested against a chance model of 50 correct predictions, the mean of the
participants in the descending group was not significantly different. In contrast, the mean
of the participants in the ascending group was significantly lower than 50, suggesting a
kind of negative illusion of control. Langer's (1975) definition of illusion of control did not
address individuals who systematically underestimate their level of performance.
8
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The abundant body of research that has examined the illusion of control
phenomenon was modeled after Langer’s (1975) initial work, and although researchers
claimed to have based their studies on Langer’s definition of illusion of control, only
Sweeney, Benassi, and Drevno (1980) have employed a direct test of Langer’s definition.
Most researchers, including Langer, have inferred an illusion o f control when participants
in an induction group provide higher scores on some indirect control measure than do
participants who are not exposed to the experimental manipulation. Only if one can
assume that individuals who are not exposed to the induction manipulation will provide
estimations of personal success that are consistent with some objective standard is a
between groups design a valid assessment of an illusion of control as defined by Langer.
In Langer’s (1975; Langer & Roth, 1975) classic papers, an illusion of control was
inferred from factors such as participants' willingness to trade a lottery ticket, estimations
of performance and predictions of future success. It is interesting that no direct measure of
control was included in these experiments. That is, participants were not asked to indicate
the degree of control they believed they had over the task outcomes. Benassi, Sweeney,
and Drevno (1979) had college students participate in a psychokinetic (PK) task in which
they were asked to attempt to manipulate a colored die by concentrating their mental
energy on making a target color land up after tossing the die. They found that the
induction groups not only reported greater confidence in their performance but also
judged their degree of control over the die to be higher than did individuals in the control
groups.
Although the differences found by Benassi et al. (1979) were statistically
9
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significant, the effect sizes were smaller for the direct measures of control than for the
confidence estimates. The difference in effect sizes may be due to Langefs (1975) notion
that intrusions of reality, such as specifically asking a person how much control they had
over the task outcome, serve to focus participants' attention back to the chance aspects of
the situation and, consequently, lessen the effect of the induction factors. This idea was
supported by Presson and Benassi's (1996) meta-analytic review of the illusion of control
literature. They found that measures designed to directly assess one's perception of
personal control produced smaller mean effect size estimates than did indirect ones.
Other researchers have focused on factors that suppress an illusion of control.
Dunn and Wilson (1990) found that when the consequences of a risky decision were high,
participants were less susceptible to an illusion of control induction. They argued that the
higher the stakes, the more carefully an individual will analyze the probability of achieving
a desired outcome. Gollwitzer and Kinney (1989) found that individuals who are
contemplating whether or not to act on their wishes (predecisional) differ in their
judgment of control over a task than individuals whose focus is on accomplishing a chosen
goal (postdecisional). They suggested that predecisional conditions result in a deliberative
mind-set which directs the individual's cognitive functioning toward the consequences of,
as well as the likelihood of, achieving a desired goal. On the other hand, postdecisional
conditions result in an implemental mind-set which directs one's cognitive functioning
toward such issues as when and how to act on the chosen goal. Consequently, persons
with a deliberative mind-set tend be less prone to an illusion of control.
The fact that so much research has been devoted to identifying the conditions
10
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under which individuals misjudge objective contingencies, or identifying the factors that
tend to moderate illusory judgments, gives credence to the validity of the illusion of
control phenomenon. However, the plethora of methodological approaches to studying the
phenomenon raises the question of whether researchers are measuring a single construct
or many constructs with some common underlying connection.
If illusion of control is a unidimensional phenomenon, then the presence of skillrelated factors in any chance-oriented situation would induce illusory judgments of
control. The first goal of this paper is to determine whether an illusion of control, as
assessed by previous researchers, is a unidimensional construct or if people differ in
susceptibility to various factors shown to induce illusory judgments. In other words, to
what degree are the induction conditions used in illusion of control research
interchangeable?
Langer's (1975) illusion of control definition focused solely on individuals'
estimations of personal success that are higher than objective odds would warrant. The
second goal of this paper is to assess whether participants who underestimate their
performance and/or contingencies also differ with regard to their judgments on other
tasks.
The third goal of this paper is to determine whether individuals' susceptibility to
illusion of control inductions is related to behavior outside the laboratory. If illusion of
control is a unidimensional process, then the behavioral manifestations of illusory
perceptions will be related to all forms of induction conditions.

11
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CHAPTER II

STUDY 1
Various researchers have proposed different conceptualizations of illusion of
control. Few researchers have actually measured participants' perception of their direct
influence over task outcomes. Instead they measured individuals'judgments of their

prediction ability, judgments of contingency, or some other indirect measure such as the
amount of money one required in order to sell a lottery ticket, and then inferred
participants' perceptions of personal control.
Researchers have also operationalized the concept o f illusion of control in many
ways (Presson & Benassi, 1996). A few experimenters directly asked participants how
much influence they felt they had over the task outcome (e.g., Benassi et al., 1979). Other
researchers employed an indirect, qualitative measure (e.g., participants' willingness to
trade one lottery ticket for another with better odds; Langer, 1975, Experiment 3). Still
others used an indirect, quantitative measure (e.g., participants' prediction of success given
an additional 100 coin flipping trials; Langer & Roth, 1975).
A typical illusion of control research paradigm consists of a single task designed to
induce an illusion of control. Langer's (1975) initial research consisted of gambling
situations such as card games and lottery tasks. Since then, illusion of control research has
consisted largely of prediction tasks (e.g., predicting the outcome of coin flips, Langer &
Roth, 1975), psychokinesis tasks (e.g., mentally influencing the outcomes of die tosses,

12
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Benassi et al., 1979), or contingency judgment tasks (e.g., judging the relation between a
key and light, Alloy & Abramson, 1979). As mentioned earlier, the dependent measures in
these studies varied from participants' willingness to sell their lottery ticket to their
perception o f their performance to their judgments of personal influence over the task
outcome. There is little doubt that an illusion of control type of effect can be obtained
from this type of research design.
The purpose of the present study is to identify whether various measures of
illusory judgments tap one single construct or various types of illusory perception. All
participants received the experimental conditions designed to induce an illusion of control.
On the key and light contingency task, all participants received a high frequency outcome
condition in which the probability o f an outcome is 75% on the trials on which the key is
pressed as well as 75% on the trials on which it is not pressed (Alloy & Abramson, 1979).
On the die tossing and coin flipping tasks, all participants received a descending series of
outcomes in which the majority of correct outcomes occur during the first half of the task
(Benassi et al., 1979; Langer & Roth, 1975). My hypothesis is that different illusion of
control measures tap into different types of illusory judgments.
Method
Participants
Ninety-one female undergraduate psychology students participated in exchange for
partial course credit. Only females were included because, based on the large body of
illusion of control literature, I had no reason to expect gender differences. Also, the
population of potential participants consisted of approximately 70% female.
13
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Materials
I assessed participants' general belief in the paranormal (e.g., extrasensory
perception and psychokinesis) on a scale created for this study (see APPENDIX A). The
scale was created using nine items adapted from the Belief in the Paranormal Scale (Jones,
Russell, & Nickel, 1977) and 11 items created for this study. Participants responded on a
five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The
Chronbach's alpha coefficient for the paranormal belief scale was .92.
I used probability generators and conventional relay circuitry to program outcome
frequencies for a task in which participants were asked to judge the relation between
pressing a telegraph key and the onset of a blue light. The circuitry was located in one
room and the telegraph key and the box with yellow and blue lights were located in
another room with the participant. On each of the 40 trials, if the participant pressed the
telegraph key within the two seconds that the yellow light was lit, one probability
generator was sampled. If no key press was made, the other generator was sampled. The
probability of an outcome (the blue light coming on) occurring following either a press or
no-press response could be independently programmed. The relay circuitry was
programmed to control stimulus presentation and to record data.
A device called a die funnel was constructed in such a way that trial outcomes
were hidden from the participants (see Benassi, et al., 1979). Each participant sat at one
end o f the die funnel and tossed a die into the chute. The experimenter retrieved the die
from a door in a box at the other end, recorded the outcome of the toss, and returned the
die to the participant.
14
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Design

I tested each participant individually. Each session was conducted in a laboratory
setting and lasted approximately 45 minutes. After signing an informed consent form,
participants were given the paranormal belief scale. Each participant was allowed to
complete the questionnaire at her own pace and was instructed to request any clarification
she felt necessary.
After each participant completed the questionnaire, I showed her the telegraph key
and the box with blue and yellow lights on it and informed her that her task was to learn
the relation between the key and blue light. I explained that the yellow light signaled the
start of each new trial and would stay on for two seconds during which she had the option
of either making a key press response or not making a key press response. I specifically
told each participant that it was in her best interest to press on some trials and not on
others in order to learn the relation between the key and the blue light.
I next informed each participant that she would have 40 trials in which to learn the
relation between the key and the blue light and that, following the 40 trials, she would be
asked to indicate her judgment of the relation on a scale from 0 fNo Relation) to 100
fPerfect Relation). Finally, I informed each participant that she might discover that there
was no relation between the key and the blue light, or that there might be some relation,
either moderate or perfect. When she indicated that she understood the instructions, I left
the room and activated the apparatus. The apparatus was programmed so that the
probability of the blue light onset on the trials on which the participant pressed the
telegraph key was 75% as well as on 75% on the no-press trials. After the participant
15
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completed the 40th trial, I returned and obtained the participant's judgment of
contingency.
I next informed each participant that the second task was a prediction task. 1
showed each participant a 50 cent piece and told her that I would flip the coin 30 times.
Her task was to attempt to guess the outcome o f each coin flip and I would inform her
whether her guess was correct. I explained that I would sit behind her while flipping the
coin so as not to hurry her prediction or somehow indicate to her what the outcome was.
In actuality, I positioned myself behind each participant so as to hide the fact that the task
was rigged. Each participant was given a prearranged pattern of feedback as to their
performance. The set pattern of feedback of 15 correct and 15 incorrect predictions with
10 correct responses occurring in the first 15 trials was based on the one used by Langer
and Roth (1975). After the 30 trials I asked each participant to write down how many
correct predictions she thought she would make if given another 100 trials.
I next explained to each participant that in the final task her job was to attempt to
influence, rather than merely predict, the outcome. I showed her two dice, each o f which
had three sides painted red and three sides painted green. I explained that she was to select
one of the two dice and, for each of the 20 trials, select a color and for five seconds focus
all her mental energy on making the target color land up at the end of the die funnel. I
explained that I would keep track of the time and after five seconds I would tell her to
begin at which time she was to throw the die into the die funnel. I would record the result
of each trial, inform her as to the outcome, and return the die to her. As in the previous
task, the feedback was rigged so that each participant received 10 correct and 10 incorrect
16
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outcomes with seven correct responses occurring in the first half of the trials. After the 20
trials, I asked each participant to indicate on how many o f the trials she felt the target
color landed up and how much control she felt she had over the outcome of the trials. Her
control estimate was indicated on a scale ranging from 0 (No control) to 10 (Complete
control). All data were coded with participant numbers to maintain anonymity.
Following the final task, I verbally debriefed each participant. I emphasized that
the outcome of each task was predetermined and did not necessarily reflect her actual
performance. I allowed each participant to ask any questions about the study and provided
her with a written explanation of the procedure and goals of the study before she left the
laboratory. I also provided each participant with the information necessary to contact me
should she have any future questions regarding the study.
Results and Discussion
All variables were examined for characteristics o f normalcy. No major violations of
the assumptions required for inferential statistics were observed.
The apparatus used in the key and light task was programmed to deliver an
outcome probability of 75% on the key-press trials and 75% on the no-press trials. Ideally,
participants were presented with a zero contingency task. However, the actual level of
contingency for any given session was based on probability and depended in part on how
many trials each participant pressed the key. Therefore, in order to determine whether
participants1estimation of contingency was accurate, it was necessary to compare their
judgment against the actual contingency. The percentage of outcomes on no-press trials
was subtracted from the percentage of outcomes on key-press trials. The absolute value of
17
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this number was then multiplied by 100 to obtain the actual level of contingency. Each
participant's judgment accuracy was determined by subtracting the actual contingency
from her judgment of contingency (A). Higher positive values of A indicate an
overestimation of contingency. Values o f A were correlated with number of key press
trials, in that more key presses were associated with greater overestimation of
contingency, £ (87) = .32, p. < .05.
Table 1 shows the zero-order correlations among the dependent measures from all
three illusion of control tasks. Participants' predictions of their performance on 100
additional coin flips was positively correlated with their perception of how well they
performed on the 20 die toss trials, r (89) = .37, p. < .05, and how much control they had
over the die, i (89) = .21, p. < .05. Higher estimates of performance on the die toss task
were also associated with reports of greater control over the outcomes o f the die tosses, r
(89) = .40, p. < .05. There was no statistically significant relation between A values and
the other three measures.
Table 1

Zero-Order Correlations Among the Four Dependent Variables from the
Three Illusion of Control Tasks
1

(1) Die toss Performance
(2) Next 100 Coin Flips
(3) Control Over Die
(4) A

1.00
.37
.40
.04

2

1.00
.21
.08

3

4

1.00
.05

1.00

I analyzed the four dependent measures from the illusion induction tasks using
principle components factor analyses with varimax rotation. In order to test the notion that
illusion of control is a unidimensional phenomenon, I forced all four measures to load onto
18
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a single factor (see Table 2). The resulting factor was an illusion of control index. If all
illusion of control tasks are tapping into a single dimension, then combining scores from
multiple measures is a valid approach to assessing one's susceptibility to illusion induction
conditions.
Table 2

Rotated Factor Loadings of the Responses to the Four Illusion of Control
Measures When Forced Onto a Single Factor.

Variable
Die toss Performance
Next 100 Coin Flips
Control Over Die
A

Factor 1
.81
.71
.69
.19

One can assume that a person's judgments o f control on a psychokinesis task are
based, at least in part, on one's belief in the paranormal. Consequently, if all illusion of
control tasks are tapping into a single construct, then participants' responses to the
dependent measures should be equally related to factors such as one's level of paranormal
belief. To test this hypothesis, I compared individuals with a high level of paranormal
belief with those reporting low levels of belief, based on a median split, Mdn = 53.
Participants in the high belief group produced a significantly higher mean index score (.30)
than did those in the low belief group (-.35), t (88) = 3.22, p < .05.
I ran another factor analysis in which the number of factors was not prespecified. I
used a factor loading value of .50 as a cutoff criterion. When the four illusion of control
measures were not restricted to loading onto one factor, two factors emerged (see Table
3).
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Table 3

Rotated Factor Loadings of the Responses to the Four Illusion of Control
Measures When Allowed to Load Onto Two Factors.

Variable

Factor 2

Factor 1

Die toss Performance
Next 100 Coin Flips
Control Over Die

.83
.70
.68

-.01
.14
.10

A

.10

.99

Illusion of Control Factor 1 (IOCF1) consisted of participants'judgment of their
performance on the 20 die toss trials, their prediction of their performance on 100
additional coin flip trials, and their judgment of their degree of psychokinetic control over
the die. Illusion of Control Factor 2 (IOCF2) consisted of A values.
In order to test whether the two illusion of control factors are tapping separate
dimensions, I again ran a series of analyses comparing those individuals reporting high
levels of paranormal belief with those reporting low levels o f belief. Participants in the
high belief group produced a significantly higher mean IOCF1 score (.30) than did the low
belief group (-.36), t (88) = 3.27, p < .05. In contrast, IOCF2 scores did not differ
significantly as a function of paranormal belief, I (88) = .08, p > .05. Based on these
results, I feel confident in labeling IOCF1 as belief-based illusions and IOCF2 as
contingency-based illusions.
People in the high paranormal belief group reported higher estimates of
performance (M = 11 -27) on the 20 die toss trials than did those in the low belief group
(M = 9.67), l (89) = 3.67, p < .05. These results are similar to those of previous
researchers who found that higher levels of paranormal belief are associated with greater
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illusory control estimates (e.g., Benassi et al., 1979). However, a between-groups
difference does not necessarily indicate an illusion of control. When compared to the mean
of 10 successes that the objective standards of chance performance would dictate, the high
belief group's mean of 11.27 is significantly higher, indicating an illusion of control, £ (48)
= 5.27, p < .05. The low belief group's mean of 9.67 was not statistically different from
the objective odds, £ (41) = .88, p > .05.
Individuals in the high belief group also reported a higher degree of personal
control over the die toss task (M = 2.82) than did participants in the low paranormal belief
group (M = 1-83), L(89) = 1.99, p < .05. These results are also supported by earlier
research (e.g., Benassi et al., 1979). If one assumes that the outcomes of a series of die
tosses are random, then an objective chance model would dictate that no personal control
exists. When compared to an objective standard of zero, both high and low belief groups
demonstrated an illusion of control, £ (48) = 7.89, p < .05 and £ (41) = 5.49, p < .05,
respectively.
Participants' prediction of their performance on 100 future coin flips did not differ
significantly as a function of their level of paranormal belief, £ (89) = 1.13, p > .05. Also,
neither the high belief group (M = 50.35) nor the low belief group (M = 47.17) differed
significantly from an objective standard of 50, £ (48) = 1.24, p > .05 and £ (41) = .20, p >
.05, respectively. One possible explanation for the similarity of performance estimates is
that the coin flip task was specifically presented as a prediction task and not a paranormal
task as was the die toss task.
A values did not differ based one's level of paranormal belief, £ (88) = .36, p > .05.
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As A refers to the difference between participants' judgment of contingency and actual
contingency, A values significantly greater than zero can be considered illusory. The mean
A values o f both high and low belief groups (M = 14.56 and 12.53, respectively) were
significantly higher than the expected A value of zero, i (48) = 3.95, p < .05 and t (40) =
2.90, p < .05, respectively.
Researchers have typically approached illusion of control as if it were a
unidimensional phenomenon based on the assumption that induction factors and dependent
measures are interchangeable. The results o f Study 1 showed that, although all participants
received the illusion inductions, not all participants showed elevated judgments across all
tasks. There exist at least two underlying bases for illusory judgments of control: (1)
belief-based illusions and (2) contingency-based illusions. What was not examined here is
the participants' ability to accurately judge contingent relations. Were they accurately
perceiving the lack of contingency or do they tend to judge most relations as
noncontingent?
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CHAPTER HI

STUDY 2

Study 1 showed that illusory control is not a unidiinensional phenomenon.
Although many types of illusory perceptions may exist, Study 1 tapped two: (1) those that
are associated with one's belief in paranormal ability and (2) those that are based on
contingency judgments. In order to explore the issue of multidimensionality further, the
present study includes two belief-oriented tasks and three basic contingency judgment
tasks. Also, the present study will obtain three measures of illusory judgments for each of
the belief-oriented tasks. In contrast to the belief-oriented tasks in Study 1, the three
dependent measures used in Study 2 will be the same for each of the tasks.
Although all participants in Study 1 received the induction conditions in the key
and light tasks, some accurately reported the lack of contingency associated with the
tasks. What was not assessed in Study 1 was whether these individuals would accurately
report contingencies when they exist or do some people merely fail to notice contingent
outcomes in all situations. In the present study, I will assess whether participants who
report no contingency are actually discriminating between contingent and non-contingent
situations.
As with the contingency tasks, participants' performance estimates from the coin
and die tasks indicated that some people accurately judged their performance even under
the induction conditions. Also, those who did not provide accurate estimates were divided
23
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between those who overestimated and those who underestimated their performance.
Langefs (1975) definition of illusion of control did not account for judgments of personal
success lower than the objective odds would warrant. She analyzed participants who
underestimated their performance as if they perceived a complete lack of control over task
outcomes. The present study will examine whether overestimators differ from
underestimators systematically. Performance estimates that are significantly lower than the
objective odds would warrant will be treated as equally illusory to those that are
significantly higher than the odds would predict. Also, in an attempt to determine whether
an illusion of control has implications beyond behavior in the laboratory, the present study
will assess participants' responses to questions regarding their day-to-day behavior.
Taylor and Brown (1988) argued that individuals who demonstrate illusory
perceptions of personal control also tend to display certain characteristics commonly
associated with mental health. Among these characteristics is happiness. Researchers have
shown that most people report feeling reasonably happy most of the time (see Diener &
Diener, 1996). Freedman (1978) concluded, based on over 52,000 responses to a
published survey, that the more one perceives a degree of personal control over life
events, the happier one tends to be. Freedman also found that those who perceive a high
degree of personal control in their lives are most likely to indicate they are currently
happy. In the current study I will examine the association between susceptibility to illusion
induction conditions and participants’ reported level of overall happiness.
In the present study I will also assess participants' desire for control. According ter
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Burger (1992), desire for control refers to the extent to which a person wants to have
control over life events. Not surprisingly, there appears to be a relation between one's
desire for control and one's susceptibility to an illusion of control. Research has shown
that individuals with a high desire for control were more likely than low desire for control
participants to attribute successful outcomes to skill rather than luck even though
performance was at a chance level (Burger, 1985, 1986; Zenker & Berman, 1982).
Individuals high in desire for control also predicted better performance on similar tasks in
the future. Burger (1992) found that people with a high level o f desire for control
preferred to choose their own lottery numbers rather than have them chosen for them and
expressed more confidence in their chances of winning.
Research has also shown that one's level of desire for control is associated with
differences in day-to-day behavior. For example, Burger (1992) found that individuals
high in desire for control were more likely to become involved in activities and
organizations. More importantly, Burger and Cooper (1979) found that desire for control
interacted with participants' perception of situational variables, such as illusion o f control
induction conditions, to produce significant differences in behavior. The present study was
designed to assess the relation between participants’ desire for control, susceptibility to
illusion of control, and self-reported behavior.
Method
Participants
One hundred eighty-two female undergraduate psychology students participated in
exchange for partial course credit. As in Study 1, only females were included because 1
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had no reason to expect gender differences and the population of potential participants
consisted of approximately 70% female.
Materials
I developed a behavior inventory (see Appendix B) for this study in which
participants indicated how many days a week, on average, they read their horoscope.
Participants were also asked to indicate how valid they believed published horoscopes to
be. Responses were made on an eight-point scale ranging from Completely Invalid to
Completely valid. Participants also indicated whether they would prefer to choose their
own lottery numbers of have them chosen for them. Next, I asked them to indicate how
often, on average, they prayed. Participants responded on an six-point scale ranging from
Never to Very often. Next, participants indicated on a nine-point scale ranging from
Definitely will not to Definitely will how likely they were to vote in the 1996 presidential
election. Next, I asked participants to indicate how often, on average, they wore seat
belts. Participants responded on an seven-point scale ranging from Never to Always.
Using items taken from Freedman's (1978) happiness survey, participants indicated
their level of happiness over the past few months, the past five years and in general.
Responses on each o f the three items were made on a nine-point scale from Extremely
Unhappy to Extremely Happy. They also indicated how optimistic they were about their
future on a seven-point scale from Very Optimistic to Very Pessimistic. Next, I asked each
participant to indicate how much control they felt they had over the good things that
happen in their lives as well as over the bad things. For both items, the four response
options ranged from Great Deal of Control to Almost No Control. Next, I asked
26
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participants to indicate whether they felt their lives had meaning and direction. Responses
were made on a four-point scale ranging from Yes. Definitely to No. Little or No
Direction and Meaning.
Freedman (1978) asked participants to indicate how important various life factors
were to their happiness. In addition to rating these items as to importance, participants in
the present study indicated their judgment of the degree to which each of these items are
generally controllable, personally controllable, and controllable by persons other than
themselves.
General belief in the paranormal was assessed on the scale created for Study 1 (see
APPENDIX A).
Finally, participants were asked to complete the Desirability of Control (DC) scale
(Burger & Cooper, 1979). The DC scale was designed to assess one's general desire for
control over life events. Participants judge the degree to which each of 20 statements
applies to her. Responses are made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1) This statement
doesn't apply to me at all to 7) This statement always applies to me. Responses are
summed with higher scores indicating higher desire for control.
Apparatus
The equipment used was the same as in Study 1.
Design

I tested each participant individually. Each experimental session was conducted in
a laboratory setting and lasted approximately 45 minutes. After signing an informed
consent form, participants were given a packet of three questionnaires. Each packet
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contained a behavior inventory, the paranormal belief scale, and the Desirability of Control
Scale (Burger & Cooper, 1979). Each participant was allowed to complete the
questionnaires at her own pace and was encouraged to request clarification on any items
that were confusing.
After each participant completed the questionnaires, I demonstrated the key and
light apparatus used in Study 1 and gave her instructions for completing the first task. The
instructions and procedure for the first task were the same as those used in Study 1 except
that participants were given only 24 trials. The apparatus was programmed so that the
probability of the blue light onset occurring on any of the trials on which the participant
pressed the telegraph key was 70% and 70% on any of the no-press trials.
The instructions and procedure for the second task were the same as for the die
toss task used in Study 1 except that the task was presented as a prediction task rather
than a psychokinesis task. I specifically informed each participant was that this task was
not designed to assess paranormal ability. After the 20 trials I asked each participant to
indicate in writing how many correct predictions she thought she made and, based on her
performance on the present 20 trials, how many correct predictions she would make if
given another 100 trials.
I next gave each participant the instructions for completing the third task. I
explained that the participant's job was to judge contingency levels. In contrast to the first
contingency task, the 24 trials were presented on a partitioned time line (see Appendix C;
Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984). I provided each participant with a sheet containing the
instructions, the scenario, a time line, and a rating scale. The instructions presented a
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scenario in which a woman, Kim, has purchased a radio only to find that it emits a buzzing
sound every now and then. Upon investigation Kim suspects that a loose wire may be the
cause of the buzzing. In an effort to troubleshoot the problem, she taps on the wire to see
if it has any effect on the buzzing. The time line indicates the results of the 24
troubleshooting trials. On some trials she taps the wire and on others she does not.
Sometimes her tapping results in the buzzing and other times it does not. On some trials
the buzzing occurs without her tapping on the wire. The actual level of contingency was
zero as the buzzing occurs on 67% of the tap trials as well as on 67% of the no-tap trials
(67/67). After hearing the scenario, I asked each participant to indicate her judgment of
the contingency between the tapping and the buzzing on a scale from -10 (prevents sounds
to +10 (causes sounds with a midpoint of 0 (has no efifecf).
The fourth task was the same as the coin flipping task in Study 1 except that the
task was presented as a precognition task and consisted of only 20 trials. I instructed each
participant to focus her mental energy on trying to foresee the outcome prior to the coin
flip. Following the 20 trials, I asked each participant to indicate the number of trials on
which she felt she correctly predicted the outcome and, based on her current precognition
performance, how many correct predictions she would make if given another 100 trials.
The final task again consisted of the tap and buzz problem used in the second task.
The instructions and procedure were the same as in the second task. This time, however,
the time line illustrated a 50% contingency, in that the buzz occurred on 92% of the tap
trials and on 42% of the no-tap trials (see Appendix D). Participants indicated their
judgment of contingency on the same type of scale used in the second task. All data was
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coded with participant numbers to maintain anonymity.
Following the final task, I verbally debriefed each participant. I emphasized that
the outcome of each task was predetermined and did not necessarily reflect the
participant's actual performance. I gave each participant the opportunity to ask any
questions about the study and I provided her with a written explanation of the procedure
and goals of the study. I also provided each participant with the information necessary to
contact me should she have any future questions regarding the study.
Results and Discussion
All variables were examined for characteristics of normalcy. No major violations of
the assumptions required for inferential statistics were observed.
I analyzed the seven dependent measures from the illusion induction tasks using
principle components factor analyses using varimax rotation. Table 4 shows the factor
loadings when all seven measures were forced to load onto a single factor.
Table 4

Rotated Factor Loadings of the Responses to the Seven Illusion of Control
Measures When Forced to Load Onto a Single Factor.

Variable
Next 100 Coin Tosses
Next 100 Die Flips
Coin Flip Performance
Die toss Performance
50% Contingency Time Line
A
0% Contingency Time Line

Factor. 1
.83
.80
.76
.71
.23
.17
-.13

Participants' accuracy of judgment on the key and light tasks (A) was calculated in the
same manner as in Study I . Accuracy measures were similarly calculated for the 0% and
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50% contingency time-line problems. The factor loading values of the coin and die task
measures were considerably larger than those from the contingency task scores.
Table 5 shows the factor loadings for the seven illusion of control measures when
they were forced to load onto two factors using .50 as a minimum loading criterion.
Although the two factor model supports the notion that performance tasks and
contingency tasks are not tapping into the same process, the current two factor model also
suggests that a distinction exists between contingencies presented in a time-line format and
those presented as a key and light task.
Table 5

Rotated Factor Loadings o f the Responses to the Seven Illusion of Control
Measures When Allowed to Load Onto Two Factors.

Variable

Factor 1

Eastor_2

Next 100 Coin Tosses
Next 100 Die Flips
Coin Flip Performance
Die toss Performance

.83
.80
.76
.71

.15
.05
.03
-.03

50% Contingency Time Line
0% Contingency Time Line
A

.23
-.13
.17

.82
.81
.38

When analyzed with a factor loading cutoff criterion of .50 but without a
prespecified number of factors, three factors emerged (see Table 6). The three factor
structure supports the multidimensional conceptualization of illusion of control. It also
shows that apparently similar types of illusory induction conditions, such as contingency
judgment tasks, can tap into separate processes.
Rotated performance estimates on the die-toss task and the coin-flipping task,
ability judgments from the die-toss and coin-flipping tasks, and future performance
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predictions made up IOC Factor I . Rotated accuracy measures from the time-line tasks
made up IOC Factor 2. Finally, rotated A scores made up IOC Factor 3.
In Study 1 I was unable to determine whether participants that reported a lack of
contingency on the key and light task were accurately assessing the contingency level or
merely bad at judging contingency in all situations. The fact that participants' accuracy
scores on the 0% and 50% contingency tasks were highly correlated indicated that they
were able to discriminate between contingent and non-contingent situations, r (180) = .75,
p < .05
Table 6

Rotated Factor Loadings of the Responses to the Seven Illusion of Control
Measures-

.Variable

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Die toss Performance
Coin Flip Performance
Next 100 Die Tosses
Next 100 Coin Flips

.74
.75
.81
.82

.02
-.06
.02
.05

-.26
.17
-.01
.20

0% Contingency Time Line
50% Contingency Time Line

-.17
.18

.85
.84

.04
.06

A

.06

.09

.94

Participants' responses to the behavior questionnaire were analyzed using principal
components factor analysis with varimax rotation. Of the 182 participants, 125 indicated
that they always wore seat belts. Likewise, 148 participants stated that they would prefer
to choose their own numbers when playing the lottery. Because o f the relative lack of
variance in these variables, they were eliminated from this and future analyses. An analysis
of the remaining variables produced a two-factor structure (see Table 7). Behavior Factor
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1 (BF1) consisted of participants' reports of how often they read their horoscope and how
much validity they ascribe to astrological forecasts. Behavior Factor 2 (BF2) included
participants' report of frequency of prayer and likelihood of voting in the 1996 presidential
election.
Factor scores on BF1 differed as a function of one's belief in the paranormal. The
mean score for low believers was -.33, whereas the mean score for high believers was .28,
£ (174) = 4.26, g < .05. Scores on BF2 did not differ significantly as a function of
paranormal belief. The mean scores for low and high believers were -.02 and .02,
respectively, £ (174) = .24, g > .05. Based on these findings, I labeled BFl belief-based
behavior and BF2 control-based behavior.
Table 7

Variable
Horoscope
Valid
Vote
Pray

Rotated Factor Loadings of the Responses to the Four-item Behavior
Questionnaire.
Factor J.

Eactor_2

.83
.77

.15
-.19

.22
-.31

.81
.67

Table 8 shows the correlations among the two behavior factors and the three
illusion of control factors. Unlike the results from Study 1, the only statistically significant
relation was between IOC Factor 3 and belief-based behavior. In other words, less
accurate contingency judgments were associated with greater likelihood of reading
published horoscopes and higher validity ratings.
As mentioned earlier, IOC Factor 1 consisted of participants' estimations of
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performance on the 20 die toss trials and the 20 coin flip trials as well as their predictions
regarding their performance on 100 future die and coin trials. Given that participants were
given performance feedback that indicated chance level performance, response accuracy
was computed by comparing participants' estimations to the objective odds. I then
trichotomized the accuracy scores to create measures that differentiated among those
people that underestimated, accurately judged, and overestimated their performance.
Table 8

Correlation Coefficients Among the Two Behavior Factors (Belief-based
& Control-based) and.the ThrggJllusiQn of Control Eaotors.

(1) Belief-based
(2) Control-based
(3) Die & Coin Tasks
(4) Time-line Tasks
(5) Key & Light Task

(1)
1.00
.00
.02
-.01
.15

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.00
-.01
.05
.05

1.00
.00
.00

1.00
.00

Scores falling more than one standard deviation below zero were categorized as
underestimators, between one standard deviation below and one standard deviation above
zero were categorized as accurate, and greater than one standard deviation above zero
were categorized as overestimators. I also created similar indices from the accuracy scores
from the two time-line tasks and the key and light task.
Belief-based behavior increased significantly as a function of accuracy scores on
the key and light contingency task, F (2, 160) = 4.43, p < .05. The mean factor scores for
the underestimators, accurate, and overestimators were -.26, .03, and .26, respectively.
Belief-based behavior was not significantly related to IOC Factors 1 or 2, F (2, 162) = 15,
p > .05 and E (2, 162) = .41, p > .05, respectively. Control-based behavior did not differ
significantly as a function of IOC Factors 1, 2, or 3, F (2, 162) = . 12, p > .05, E (2, 162) =
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. 18, p > .05, and E (2, 162) = .08, p > .05, respectively.
Moderating Variables - Desire for Control and Paranormal Belief
Burger and Cooper (1979) found that individuals with a high desire for control
wagered more on a dice throwing game than did those with a low desire for control even
though both groups received the same illusion of control induction condition. They also
found that a high desire for control was associated with reports of greater feelings of
depression than was a low desire for control following learned helplessness induction
conditions. Finally, Burger and Cooper observed that when participants were led to
believe that they were in control of their own behavior under hypnosis, those with a high
desire for control responded to hypnotic suggestions more often than low desire for
control participants. In all three experiments, Burger and Cooper concluded that individual
differences in desire for control interacted with participants' perceptions of the situational
variables to produce significant differences in behavior.
The present study examined the moderating effects of desire for control and
paranormal belief, on the situational variables associated with illusion of control tasks. I
ran a series of analyses of variance in which behavioral measures were analyzed as a
function o f paranormal belief, desire for control, and each of the three illusion of control
factors. When significant results (a = .05) were observed from analyses including one of
the three illusion of control factors, figures showing the results of similar analyses
including all three factors will be presented in addition to reporting the results in the text.
When the results were not statistically significant for all three illusion of control factors,
results will be reported without the accompanying figures. Differential interactions among
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the three illusion factors would support the multidimensional conceptualization of illusion
of control.
As demonstrated earlier, higher levels of belief-based behavior were associated
with greater levels of belief in the paranormal but not as a function o f desire for control, F
(1, 160) = 17.90, p < .05 and E (1, 160) = .41, p > 05, respectively. In contrast, controlbased behavior differed as a function of desire for control but not as a function of
paranormal belief E (1, 162) = 15.70, p < .05 and E (1, 162) = .20, p > .05, respectively.
Individuals with a high level o f desire for control had a mean control-based factor score of
.25, whereas those with a low level of desire for control had a mean factor score of -.31.
With regard to control-based behavior, the interaction between desire for control
and paranormal belief was interesting (see Figure 1), F (1, 170) = 3.65, p > .05.
The overall pattern was similar to the main effect for desire for control in that high desire
for control participants scored higher than did those in the low desire for control group.
However, among the high belief group, low desire for control individuals produced a mean
factor score of -.41 compared to the high desire for control group's mean of .40, t (92) =
4.08, p < .05. In contrast, among the low paranormal belief group, the low desire for
control individuals' mean factor score of -. 19 was not significantly different from the high
desire for control group's mean of .09, t (78) = 1.30, p > .05.
In contrast to control-based behavior, the interaction between desire for control
and paranormal belief was less noticeable with regard to belief-based behavior (see Figure
2), F (1, 162) = 2.80, p > .05.
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Figure 1
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Although the effect of paranormal belief was somewhat moderated by desire for control,
paranormal belief still predicted significantly different levels of belief-based behavior.
Among those participants reporting a low desire for control, those with a low level
o f belief in the paranormal produced a mean factor score of -.36 compared to the mean of
.39 for those with a high level of belief, t (80) = 3.96, p < .05. Participants with a high
desire for control and a low level of paranormal belief produced a mean factor score of .28 compared to the mean o f . 14 for those participants with a high level of paranormal
belief, £ (90) = 2.00, p < .05.
As mentioned above, differences in control-based behavior were not associated
with level of paranormal belief. However, Figure 3 shows that belief in the paranormal
interacted with performance estimates on the die toss and coin flip tasks to predict
control-based behavior, E (2, 162) = 3.65, p < .05. Participants who underestimated their
performance on the tasks did not differ noticeably as a function o f paranormal belief.
Those who accurately judged their performance level and had a high level of paranormal
belief produced a higher control-based factor score (M = 18) than did those individuals
who accurately judged their performance and had a low level of paranormal belief (M = .16). The pattern for those who overestimated their performance was opposite that of the
participants in the accurate group. Those who overestimated and reported a high level of
belief produced a mean factor score of -.26 compared to a mean o f .20 produced by the
participants in the low belief group. No noticeable interaction was observed between
participants performance estimates and desire for control, E (2, 162) = .06, p > .05.
If illusion of control is a unidimensional phenomenon, then one would expect to
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observe a similar interaction pattern between judgments obtained from all three induction
conditions and moderating variables such as belief in the paranormal.
Figure 3

The Interactive Effects of Paranormal Belief and Performance Estimates
on Die and Coin Tasks on Control-Based Behavior
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Figure 4 shows the interaction between paranormal belief and contingency judgments
from the time-line tasks on control-based behavior, E (2, 162) = .34, p > .05. A
comparison of the interactions between belief in the paranormal and accuracy judgments
on the coin and die tasks and the time-line tasks lends support to the conceptualization of
illusion of control as a multidimensional phenomenon. Whereas Figure 3 shows that
overestimators and accurate judges on coin and die tasks reversed their control-based
behavior scores as a function of paranormal belief, Figure 4 shows that the patterns for
;
the two groups were similar when paranormal belief interacted with time-line
contingency judgments.
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Figure 4

The Interactive Effects of Paranormal Belief and Contingency Judgments
from the Time-line Tasks on Control-Based Behavior
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Figure 5 shows that with regard to control-based behavior, paranormal belief interacted
with accuracy scores from the key and light task in a similar manner as with judgments
from the time-line tasks, E (2,168) = 2.03, p < .05. No noticeable interaction was
observed between participants time-line contingency judgments and desire for control, E
(2, 162) = .92, p > .05. or key and light scores and desire for control, E (2,162) = .51, p >
.05.
Not surprisingly, level of belief in the paranormal was the best predictor of beliefbased behavior, E (1, 160) = 17.90, p < .05. No noticeable interaction was observed
between paranormal belief and coin and die task performance estimates, E (2,162) = .46,
p > .05, between belief and time-line contingency judgments, E (2, 162) = .30, p > .05. or
between belief and key and light task scores, E (2, 162) = .19, p > .05. Likewise, no
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interactions were found between desire for control and coin and die task performance
estimates, £ (2,162) = .17, p > .05, between belief and time-line contingency judgments,
E (2, 162) = .25, |2 > .05, or between belief and key and light task scores, E (2, 162) = .34,
p > .05.
Figure 5

The Interactive Effects of Paranormal Belief and Contingency Judgments
from the Kev & Light Tasks on Control-BasedJBehavior
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Freedman (1978) found that beliefs about personal control played a role in one's
overall level of happiness. In the current study, overall happiness did not differ
significantly as a function of desire for control, E (1,168) = .05, p > .05, level of
paranormal belief, E (1, 168) = .53, p > .05, accuracy scores from the die and coin tasks,
E(2, 168) = .90, p > .05, the time-line tasks, E (2, 168) = 1.21, p > .05, or the key and
light task, E (2, 168) = 1.95, p > .05. No interaction was found between desire for control
and paranormal belief, E (1,168) = .21, p > .05.
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Accuracy scores on the time-line contingency tasks interacted with desire for
control to predict overall happiness (see Figure 6), E (2, 168) = 4.25, p < .05.
Figure 6

The Interactive Effects of Desire for. Control and Time-line Contingency
Judgments on Reports of Overall Happiness
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Participants reporting a low desire for control did not differ noticeably on overall
happiness. In contrast, those individuals reporting a high desire for control who accurately
judged the contingency level on the two time-line tasks reported a lower overall
happiness score than either the overestunators or underestimators. These findings lend a
degree of support for Taylor and Brown's (1988) notion that illusory perceptions of
control are associated with greater happiness, but only when one is motivated by a high
desire for control. In addition, Taylor and Brown's theory only included those who
overestimate their level of personal control. Perhaps more importantly, the current
findings add further support to Burger and Cooper's (1979) theory that one's desire for
42
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control interacts with perceptions of situational variables to produce differences in
behavior, in this case, reports o f overall happiness.
Figure 7 shows that accuracy scores from the time-line contingency tasks
interacted with paranormal belief in a somewhat similar manner as with desire for
control, E (2,168) = 4.07, p < .05. The most noticeable difference can be seen among
those participants who overestimated the contingency level. Those who reported a low
level of paranormal belief reported being happier overall than did those in the high belief
group.
Figure 7

The Interactive Effects of Paranormal Belief and Time-line Contingency
Judgments on Reports of Overall Happiness
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Participants' performance estimates on the die and coin tasks did not interact with
;

either paranormal belief or desire for control, E (2,168) = .35. p > .05 and F (2,168) =
.38, p > .05, respectively. No significant interactions were found between accuracy scores
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from the key and light task and either paranormal belief or desire for control, F (2, 168) =
.98, p > .05 and F (2, 168) = 1.04, £ > .05.
As in Study 1, the present study showed that illusion of control is a
multidimensional phenomenon. In addition, the current results showed that illusory
judgments include those that are lower than the objective odds would warrant. Moderating
variables interacted differentially with type of illusory judgment as well as direction of
illusion. Previous researchers may have missed or underestimated their magnitude of effect
by failing to remove underestimators from the nonillusory of control group.
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CHAPTER IV

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Langer (1975) defined an illusion of control as an estimate of the probability of
personal success higher than objective probability would warrant. She argued that one's
judgment of personal control is not determined by the objective contingency between one's
behavior and the task outcomes. Rather, she claimed that it is the presence of skill-related
factors that often blurs the distinction between chance- and skill-oriented events. She also
claimed that in any chance-oriented situation, skill-related factors make the event appear
more like a skill-oriented situation and increase the likelihood that an individual will
perceive the event as personally controllable. Langer and Roth (1975) argued that humans
are so strongly motivated to control life events that even the presence of a single skillrelated cue is enough to induce an illusion of control.
Since Langer*s (1975) introduction of the illusion of control concept, the basic
research paradigm has remained unchanged. All participants are presented with a chanceoriented task. One group is exposed to what Langer referred to as skill-related factors.
Skill-related factors are those that are commonly associated with improved performance
on skill-related tasks (e.g., practice, choice, involvement). After completion of the task, a
behavioral measure is assessed (e.g., money wagered, performance on the task estimated,
future performance predicted). Based on observed differences in these behavioral
measures, Langer and other researchers have inferred differences in participants'
45
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perceptions of personal control over the task outcomes.
Although not directly claimed, experimental design and the conclusions derived
from them have suggested that the type of experimental task was more or less irrelevant to
the illusion induction. Illusion of control research was conducted as if all that was required
to produce an illusion of control was the introduction of skill-related factors into any
chance-oriented task. Also, a person who is susceptible to one illusion induction condition
would also be susceptible to other induction conditions.
The results of Study 1 challenged the commonly held assumption that illusion of
control is a unidimensional phenomenon. By presenting participants with multiple
experimental tasks, I addressed the question of whether the introduction of skill-related
factors into all experimental tasks tap into a single process resulting in an illusion of
personal control. A factor analysis of the dependent measures supported a
multidimensional conceptualization of illusion of control in that two factors emerged. The
present research indicated that different tasks tap into different judgmental processes.
Individual differences on performance estimates on tasks such as the coin flip and die toss
were associated with difference in paranormal belief whereas judgments on the key and
light contingency task were not.
Study 2 confirmed the multifactor structure observed in Study 1 in that the coin
and die tasks were distinguished from the contingency tasks. The three factor structure
that distinguished contingency judgments on the key and light task from those on the time
line tasks indicated that apparently similar tasks can tap into different processes. In Study
2 I examined the notion that, like overestimators, individuals who report judgments lower
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than the objective odds would warrant are also illusory. The results showed that, although
the judgments of underestimators and overestimators were often equally deviant compared
to accurate participants, they often demonstrated different behavior patterns. Langer
(1975) limited her definition of what constitutes illusion to overestimators and, in doing
so, possibly missed identifying the entire range of effects associated with illusory
judgments. The findings presented in this paper show that some illusory judgments are
associated with control issues, such as desire for control. However, the present paper
extends findings of previous researchers to include the notion that illusory judgments are
multidimensional and that research into this area has a wider range of implications than
previously demonstrated.
The finding that various types of illusion inductions interact differentially with
certain moderating variables suggests that researchers may overlook the effects of certain
well designed induction tasks due to a failure to account for individual differences in
factors such as paranormal belief and desire for control. Future researchers should attempt
to identify additional moderating variables such as self-efficacy and self-esteem.
Illusion of control effects have been found across a wide variety of tasks and in
many different situations. However, some researchers have questioned whether the vast
body of illusion of control research has addressed a single underlying construct (see
Presson & Benassi, 1996). Until now, Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) were the only
researchers who had proposed a multidimensional model of the illusion of control
phenomenon. Although they agreed with Langer (1975; Langer & Roth, 1975) that
humans are strongly motivated to control their environment and this motivation may cause
47
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individuals to perceive control in chance-oriented situations, they differentiated between
perceptions of primary control and secondary control. Primary control refers to a person's
efforts to directly influence the environment. Secondary control refers to one's attempt to
control a situation by aligning oneself with powerful external forces such as chance.
Rothbaum and his colleagues argued that illusion of control theorists have limited their
conceptualization of control to primary control only and have virtually ignored secondary
control.
Researchers interested in illusory control as defined by Langer (1975) might profit
if they focus their measures on perceptions of direct personal influence over outcomes —
i.e., primary control. This is not to say that Rothbaum's concept of secondary control
should be dismissed. After all, if people who appear to be relinquishing control to chance,
fate, or other external forces are actually attempting to maintain control through an
alliance with what are perceived to be controlling agents, then theorists will need to
rethink their conception of personal control and, perhaps more important, how they define
illusory perceptions. I believe that the distinction between primary and secondary control
is an interesting one and should be addressed in future research. However, for purposes of
this paper, control was conceptualized in terms of actions or choices that have a direct
influence on the environment.
Langer (1975) and other illusion of control researchers have claimed that the
presence of skill-related factors blurs the distinction between chance- and skill-related
events. In contrast, Rothbaum et al. (1982) argued that most people are quite capable of
accurately perceiving the chance nature of situations. It is the perception of the role that
48
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chance plays in the outcome of an event that provides one with the opportunity to exert
secondary control. It is by recognizing that chance is the controlling factor and aligning
oneself with it that one is able to maintain a degree of control over the situation.
Rothbaum and his colleagues acknowledged the fact that in some chance-oriented
situations people's illusory judgments may reflect perceptions of their level of personal
control. They suggested, however, that in most cases, an illusion of control may involve
aspects of both primary and secondary control.
The results of Study 1 support the hypothesis that illusion of control is not a
unidimensional construct. They indicated that at least two forms of illusory perceptions
exist. One form of illusory perception was associated with one's level of belief in
paranormal phenomena, the other was based on one's ability to accurately judge
contingencies. Although the results of Study 1 do not support Rothbaum et al.'s (1982)
suggestion that most people can accurately judge the lack of contingency in chance
situations, they do show that even when participants were all given the illusion of control
induction, they responded with an extreme range of judgments. These results suggest that
all induction techniques do not evoke the same underlying process. Instead of illusion of
control, Presson and Benassi (1996, p. 14) suggested that illusory judgment is a more
appropriate label for the phenomena presented in this area of research.
Rothbaum et al. (1982) claimed that secondary control is evidenced by the fact that
people often treat chance as a powerful external agent. They argued that this can be seen
in people's belief in supernatural powers, psychics, and astrology. Study 1 demonstrated
that paranormal belief is a key factor in one type of illusory judgment. Also, belief-based
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illusions were shown to differ from contingency-based illusions primarily in that belief did
not play a role in determining whether or not participants proved to be susceptible to
illusory contingency judgments. These findings lend support, at least in part, to Rothbaum
et al.'s multidimensional concept.
Methodological Implications
Alloy and Clements (1992) examined whether individual differences in
susceptibility to an illusion of control induction condition predicted subsequent depressive
symptoms following naturally occurring stressors. They concluded that an illusion of
control decreased the likelihood that participants would experience an increase in
depressive symptoms one month following the initial experimental session. Their
conclusion was reached after exposing participants to an illusion induction condition
similar to the key and light task used by Alloy and Abramson (1979) and in the current
paper. In Alloy and Clements' study, the trials were presented on a computer screen and
participants were to judge how much control their responses (pressing or not pressing the
space bar) had on the appearance of a white square. The computer was programmed to
present the white square on 20 of the 40 trials. The trials on which the white square was
presented were selected randomly by the computer program. Participants were told that
they would receive a quarter each time the square came on the screen so it was in their
best interest to learn how to influence its appearance. Because all participants were
presented with the white square on 50% of the 40 trials, all won $5.00 noncontingently.
Following the completion of the task, participants were asked to indicate the
degree o f control their responses had over the onset of the white square by placing an X
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on the Judgment of Control Scale (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). The scale ranged from 0 to
100 in units of 5, with 0 labeled no control and 100 labeled complete control. The 50%
point was labeled intermediate control. According to Alloy and Clements (1992), because
the appearance o f the white square was not contingent on the participants' responses, the
higher their judgment of control, the greater the illusion of control they showed.
Participants' level of depression was assessed twice, at the initial session and one month
later. In a prospective design in which stress level and initial level of depression were
statistically controlled for, Alloy and Clements found that illusion of control interacted
with number of negative life events to predict subsequent depressive symptoms one
month after the initial session. They concluded that an illusion o f control served to protect
participants from increases in depressive symptoms after experiencing a high number of
stressors during the one month interval between experimental sessions.
Based on the findings of the present paper, one could argue that the effects
observed by Alloy and Clements (1992) could have been missed had they used a different
induction condition. For example, in Study 2 I found that belief-based behavior increased
significantly as a function of accuracy scores on the key and light contingency task.
However, scores from the time-line contingency tasks were not associated with differences
in belief-based behavior. Therefore, it is possible that even a different contingency task
would have failed to produce the differences in subsequent depression found by Alloy and
Clements.
Alloy and Clements (1992) explicitly defined an illusion of control as a person's
judgment of control over an uncontrollable outcome. The uncontrollable outcome in their
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study was the onset of a white square on a computer screen. As mentioned earlier, the
computer was programmed to present the white square on 50% of the 40 trials regardless
of the participants' responses (pressing or not pressing the space bar). Thus, in actuality,
the outcome was uncontrollable and the higher one's judgment of control, the greater the
illusion of control being demonstrated. However, in order for the researchers to know that
a participant has experienced a zero contingency task, they must take into account the
number of trials on which the participant pressed the space bar and received the outcome
as well as the number of trials on which the bar was not pressed and the outcome was
presented. For example, if the participant pressed on 10 of the 40 trials and did not press
on 30 and then received the white square on five of the press trials and 15 of the no-press
trials, then the actual contingency of the task would be zero. However, if that same
participant received the white square on eight of the 10 press trials and 12 of the no-press
trials, then the actual contingency would be 40%. Alloy and Clements' computer was
programmed to present the white square on 20 randomly selected trials. Depending on the
number and pattern o f space bar presses, the actual contingency level of the task could
theoretically range from 0 to 100%.
In Study 2, the key and light contingency task, which is similar to the one used by
Alloy and Clements (1992), consisted of a relay apparatus which was programmed to
deliver a 70% probability o f an outcome presentation on each key press trial and a 70%
probability of an outcome on each no-press trial. Ideally, participants experienced a zero
contingency task. Table 9 shows the range of actual contingencies observed. The actual
contingencies ranged from 0 to 60%, with only 6 out of 180 cases at 0%. Of the 182
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participants in Study 2, 67 judged the key/light contingency as 0% and only two were
accurate.
Of the 67 who reported 0% contingency, 20 underestimated actual contingency by at least
20%.

If I had employed Alloy and Clements' criteria for determining illusory judgments,
two of the five participants who received the 20% contingency would have been
misclassified. One correcdy judged the contingency level and, therefore, should have been
included in the accurate group. Another reported the contingency as zero and would have
been classified as completely accurate even though she had underestimated the
contingency by 20%. The extreme judgment in Study 2 was 70% and, according to Alloy
and Clements, would be the most illusory participant. The actual contingency experienced
by that particular participant was 60.87% . Therefore, her actual degree o f overestimation
was 9.13% rather than 70%. The effect found by Alloy and Clements may have been even
greater had they removed those participants who underestimated the contingency level and
included those individuals who were accurate but were classified as illusory. On the other
hand, Alloy and Clements' (1992) findings may have been due to participants'judgments of
control whether illusory or not. Perhaps it was the judgment of control that protected the
participants from subsequent depressive symptoms. If true, then their method of measure
of control is fine but it isn't necessarily illusory and may have disappeared had they actually
measured degree of illusory judgments.
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Table 9

Actual Contingencies from the 70/70 Key and Light Task Used in Stu.dv.2.

Contingency Frequency
6
.00
1
.70
1
1.43
1
2.10
3
2.22
1
2.80
1
2.86
1
3.16
3
3.50
1
4.20
1
4.29
5
4.44
2
4.90
2
5.04
2
5.56
1
5.71
4
6.25
1
6.29
4
6.67
3
6.72
1
7.14
1
7.56
9
8.33
4
8.57
1
8.89
1
9.09
1
10.00
1
10.49
1
11.03
2
11.11
2
11.19
4
11.43
1
11.58
3
12.50
1
12.59
1
12.61
1
12.86
1
13.29
1
13.99
14.29
2

Contingency Frequency
2
14.69
1
15.56
5
15.71
1
16.18
6
16.67
1
17.39
2
17.48
4
17.78
1
18.18
1
18.57
2
18.75
1
18.88
1
19.05
1
19.33
5
20.00
20.28
2
1
20.98
I
21.43
6
22.22
2
22.38
1
22.86
1
23.08
1
23.81
1
24.29
2
24.44
3
25.00
1
25.71
1
26.57
1
27.78
2
27.97
2
28.57
1
29.37
2
30.07
1
30.43
1
31.09
2
31.11
1
31.25
1
31.43
1
31.47
1
31.58

Contingency Frequency
1
32.86
5
33.33
1
34.27
2
34.29
1
35.29
2
37.50
1
38.89
1
40.00
3
41.43
1
43.75
45.00
1
1
48.57
1
50.00
1
52.86
1
53.33
1
60.87
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Study 2 showed that underestimators often behave differently than do accurate
judges of contingencies. Alloy and Clements (1992) may have missed an additional aspect
of their study by failing to identify participants who underestimated the contingency level.
The present paper identified two types of illusory judgments. Future research
should examine other induction conditions, such as the gambling tasks used by Langer
(1975) as to additional processes that result in illusory judgments. Also future research
should further examine the role of what Langer referred to as "intrusions of reality." In
their meta-analysis, Presson and Benassi discovered that some researchers informed their
participants of the possible chance nature of the task outcomes while others did not. None,
however, manipulated this variable. Langer claimed that factors that draw the person's
attention toward the chance aspects of the situation can suppress the illusion induction
conditions. It would be interesting to discover whether intrusions of reality can suppress
underestimations as well as overestimations.
In conclusion, the results o f this paper showed that illusion of control is a more
complex phenomenon than previously thought. The theoretical assumption that the
conditions under which an illusion of control can be induced are interchangeable and one's
susceptibility to such an induction is common to all conditions needs to be reexamined. In
addition, the idea that the effects observed from the induction conditions are the result of a
change in one's perception of personal control is at best an overstatement, and at worst,
totally incorrect. The results of the current paper suggest that illusion of control type
effects are the result of at least three processes, one of which involves personal control. In
addition to the three factors observed in the current paper, others probably exist. Although
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there is little doubt that the traditional illusion of control paradigm produces a consistent
effect, researchers may be missing certain aspects of the complex phenomenon by treating
it as unidimensional. Researchers would benefit from identifying the full range of
processes that result in illusory judgments. I will close by restating the suggestion of
Presson and Benassi (1996) that illusion of control be relabeled as illusory judgments
because of its allowance for a wider range of processes.
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APPENDIX A

GENERAL BELIEF IN THE PARANORMAL SCALE

After reading each of the 20 statements below, indicate your degree of agreement with its
contents using the following rating scale:
1 = strongly disagree
2 = disagree
3 = undecided
4 = agree
5 = strongly agree
PUT RATING
HERE
1.

It is likely that many phenomena such as ESP (Extra Sensory Perception)
will one day be proven to exist.

2.

I believe that, at least on some occasions, I can read another person's mind
through ESP.

3.

ESP is a gift that many people have, and should not be confused with the
elaborate tricks used by entertainers.

4.

All of the reports of scientific proof for the existence of psychic phenomena
are sensationalism with no factual basis.

5.

With proper training anyone could learn to read other people's minds.

6.

Plants can sense the feelings of humans through a form of ESP.

7.

ESP has been scientifically proven to exist.

8.

I believe that psychic phenomena are real.

9.

Some people can make physical objects move or cause them to change
shape by their powers of concentration.

10.

Some people have the power to bend objects (e.g. spoons) with only their
thoughts.
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11.

Some people can accurately predict the outcomes of dice throws.

12.

There may be some validity to psychic phenomena.

13.

With proper training, I could develop ESP.

14.

I believe that I have precognitive ability.

15.

I believe that I can project my thoughts to another person.

16.

Dice throwing depends entirely on chance.

17.

Some people can accurately visualize things before they happen.

18.

If I concentrate enough I could learn to bend objects (e.g. spoons), using
only my thoughts.

19.

Premonitions never have a psychic basis to them.

20.

If I wanted to see what the future had in store for me, Icould use tarot
cards or an astrology chart.
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APPENDIX B

BEHAVIOR QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN STUDY 2

1.

On average, how many days a week do you read your horoscope?
0— l —2— 3—4— 5— 6— 7

2.

To what extent do you believe that horoscopes are valid?
Completely Invalid
Very Invalid
Moderately Invalid
Slightly Invalid
Slightly Valid
Moderately Valid
Very Valid
Completely Valid

3.

If given a choice when playing the state lottery, would you prefer to choose your
own numbers or have your numbers chosen for you (computer generated)?
choose your own numbers

4.

numbers are chosen for you

On average, how often do you pray?
Never
Very Seldom
Seldom
Occasionally
Often
Very often
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5.

How likely are you to vote in the upcoming presidential election?
Definitely Will Not
Very Unlikely
Moderately Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Unsure
Somewhat Likely
Moderately Likely
Very Likely
Definitely Will

6.

On average, how often do you wear seat belts.
Never
Very Seldom
Seldom
About 1/2 of the time
Often
Very often
Always

7.

In general, over the past few months how happy have you been?
Extremely Unhappy
Very Unhappy
Moderately Unhappy
Slightly Unhappy
Neutral
Slightly Happy
Moderately Happy
Very Happy
Extremely Happy
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8.

In general, over the past five years how happy have you been?

•

9.

Extremely Unhappy
Very Unhappy
Moderately Unhappy
Slightly Unhappy
Neutral
Slightly Happy
Moderately Happy
Very Happy
Extremely Happy

In general, during your life up to now how happy have you been?
Extremely Unhappy
Very Unhappy
Moderately Unhappy
Slightly Unhappy
Neutral
Slightly Happy
Moderately Happy
Very Happy
Extremely Happy

10.

How optimistic or pessimistic are you about your future?
Very Optimistic
Moderately Optimistic
Slightly Optimistic
Neutral
Slightly Pessimistic
Moderately Pessimistic
Very Pessimistic

11.

How much control do you think you have over the good things that happen to you
in life?
Great Deal of Control
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Moderate Amount of Control
Only a Little Control
Almost No Control

12.

How much control do you think you have over the bad things that happen to you
in life?
Great Deal of Control
Moderate Amount of Control
Only a Little Control
Almost No Control

13.

Do you feel you life has meaning and direction?
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Moderately
Yes, Somewhat
No, Little or No Direction and Meaning
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14.

Here are parts of life that other people have considered important to their
happiness. Consider each one and decide how important it is to your happiness.
Rate each on the following 5-point scale:
1 = Not Important
2 = Slightly Important
3 = Somewhat Important
4 = Moderately Important
5 = Very Important
Financial Situation

_____

Job or Occupation

_____

Friends

_____

Community (where you live)

_____

Romantic Relationship in General

_____

Being in Love

_____

Being Loved

_____

Sex Life_______________________ _____
Marriage

_____

Children

_____

Achievement (of any kind)

_____

Success in Career_____________________
Feeling of Accomplishment

_____

Health

_____

Religion (organized)

_____

Religious or Spiritual Beliefs

_____
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15.

Now rate the degree to which you feel these items can be controlled (in general, by
anyone). Rate each on the following 5-point scale:
1 = No Control
2 = Little Control
3 = Moderate Control
4 = Considerable Control
5 = Complete Control
Financial Situation

_____

Job or Occupation

_____

Friends

_____

Community (where you live)

_____

Romantic Relationship in General

_____

Being in Love

_____

Being Loved

_____

Sex Life_______________________ _____
Marriage

_____

Children

_____

Achievement (of any kind)

_____

Success in Career_______________ _____
Feeling of Accomplishment

_____

Health

_____

Religion (organized)_____________ _____
Religious or Spiritual Beliefs____________
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16.

Now rate how much personal control you have over each item. Rate each on the
following 5-point scale:
1 = No Personal Control
2 = Little Personal Control
3 = Moderate Personal Control
4 = Considerable Personal Control
5 = Complete Control
Financial Situation

_____

Job or Occupation

_____

Friends

_____

Community (where you live)

_____

Romantic Relationship in General

_____

Being in Love

_____

Being Loved

_____

Sex Life_______________________ _____
Marriage

_____

Children

_____

Achievement (of any kind)

_____

Success in Career_______________ _____
Feeling of Accomplishment

_____

Health

_____

Religion (organized)

_____

Religious or Spiritual Beliefs

_____

70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17.

Now rate how much control you feel other people have over these items in your
life. For example, how much control other people have over your financial
situation. Rate each on the following 5-point scale:
1 = No Control
2 = Little Control
3 = Moderate Control
4 = Considerable Control
5 = Complete Control
Financial Situation

_____

Job or Occupation

_____

Friends

_____

Community (where you live)

_____

Romantic Relationship in General

_____

Being in Love

_____

Being Loved

_____

Sex Life_______________________ _____
Marriage

_____

Children

_____

Achievement (of any kind)

_____

Success in Career_____________________
Feeling of Accomplishment

_____

Health

_____

Religion (organized)

_____

Religious or Spiritual Beliefs

_____
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APPENDIX C

ZERO % CONTINGENCY TIME LINE USED IN STUDY 2 (67/67)

In the diagram below, each dash on the time line represents one unit of time. Time units
come in pairs, which are separated from each other by a vertical line. The first dash in a
pair is an opportunity for a response (Tap or No Tap) and the second is an opportunity for
an outcome (Buzz or No Buzz). Thus, pairs of successive intervals can be of four types:
Tap-Buzz ( I B ) , Tap-No Buzz ( X _ ) , No Tap-Buzz ( _ £ ) , No Tap-No Buzz ( ___).
After carefully examining the time line below, please rate the relation between Kimjjs
tapping and the radio’s buzzing, from “prevents the sound from occurring” to causes the
sound to occur.”

i a i _ B | I J ! J _ B | T B H . L B I J E l L J J I g l J i e L E I J E f i L l I TB|_ _ L _ I I _ l _ _ | _ g | _ g | I g L B

-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Prevents
Has no
Causes
Sound
Effect
Sound

On the scale below, please circle the number that describes your degree of confidence that
your judgment on the above scale is accurate.

2
Not at all
Confident

3
Moderately
Confident

4

5
Completely
Confident
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APPENDIX D

50 % CONTINGENCY TIME LINE USED IN STUDY 2 (92/42)

In the diagram below, each dash on the time line represents one unit of time. Time units
come in pairs, which are separated from each other by a vertical line. The first dash in a
pair is an opportunity for a response (Tap or No Tap) and the second is an opportunity for
an outcome (Buzz or No Buzz). Thus, pairs of successive intervals can be of four types:
Tap-Buzz ( I E ) , Tap-No Buzz ( T _ ), No Tap-Buzz ( _ B ), No Tap-No Buzz ( ___).
After carefully examining the time line below, please rate the relation between Kim|)s
tapping and the radio’s buzzing, from “prevents the sound from occurring” to causes the
sound to occur.”

I£ I_ B II.£ L _ I

IJTBII^I

IIB I__ IJ:B |_B |_ _|___|_£| T _ | _ £ | . I . g | I J & I X £ | _ £ | T.BI___| £ f i

-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Prevents
Has no
Causes
Sound
Effect
Sound

On the scale below, please circle the number that describes your degree of confidence that
your judgment on the above scale is accurate.

1
Not at all
Confident

2

3
Moderately
Confident

4

5
Completely
Confident

73

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

